The geopolitical landscape of Europe has undergone a fundamental transformation, accelerating a shift in defense policy not seen since the Cold War. For decades, the continent relied on the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the implicit guarantee of U.S. military power. However, two colossal and converging forces—the reality of prolonged Russian aggression and growing uncertainty regarding Washington’s long-term commitment to European security—have shattered this reliance, forcing the European Union (EU) and its member states into a state of rapid and comprehensive rearmament.

This European defense imperative is multifaceted, encompassing not just a drastic increase in financial expenditure but also the development of a cohesive industrial strategy, a renewed focus on military production capacity, and a painful reckoning with the necessity of achieving greater strategic autonomy. The shift is marked by a deep-seated anxiety, particularly among frontline states, who recognize that deterrence now rests increasingly on their own conventional capabilities.

Data from leading security and defense institutions confirms this pivot. Global military expenditure reached an unprecedented high in recent years, driven largely by the massive military build-up across Europe. This spending is not merely a symbolic gesture; it represents a commitment to replenish stockpiles depleted by aid to Ukraine, modernize existing forces, and, most importantly, create the industrial capacity needed for sustained high-intensity conflict should Russia decide to test the cohesion of the NATO alliance beyond Ukrainian borders.

The Unprecedented Spending Surge: Analyzing the Financial Commitment

The financial scale of Europe’s response to the changed security environment is staggering. For the first time since the Cold War’s end, European military spending has surged past previous ceilings, making the continent a primary driver of the global expenditure increase. This rise is a direct acknowledgment that the peace dividend enjoyed for over three decades is fully spent.

SIPRI Data and Global Context

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world military expenditure increased significantly, registering the steepest year-on-year rise since at least the end of the Cold War. Europe, including Russia, contributed substantially to this surge, with spending rising by over 17% to reach $693 billion in 2024. This increase pushed overall European military spending beyond the level recorded at the conclusion of the Cold War era.

Within this context, the financial commitment is clearly targeted. Central and Western European nations have seen the most unprecedented rises, implementing vast procurement plans and activating special defense funds. This aggressive spending aims to both support Ukraine and simultaneously shore up national defenses against the perceived threat of Russian expansionism.

NATO’s 2% Commitment and Beyond

The long-standing NATO goal for member states to dedicate 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense has rapidly transitioned from a controversial benchmark to a floor for expenditure. Driven initially by American pressure but now fueled by existential threat perception, the number of NATO allies meeting or exceeding the 2% threshold is expected to grow dramatically. Sweden, in its first year of NATO membership, quickly reached the 2.0% mark, underscoring the shift in priorities.

Furthermore, NATO members have engaged in discussions to raise the defense spending standard even higher, with proposals to increase the commitment further in the coming years, reflecting a recognition that modern deterrence requires deeper and more consistent investment. While reaching even higher percentages, such as 5% of GDP, may remain politically and economically unfeasible for most nations, the trend towards substantial, sustained investment is firmly established.

Case Studies: Germany, Poland, and the Frontline States

The response of individual nations paints a vivid picture of the severity of the perceived threat. Germany, long criticized for its low defense spending, initiated a monumental policy reversal—the Zeitenwende—earmarking a $100 billion special fund for military modernization. Germany’s military expenditure subsequently increased by 28%, making it the biggest spender in Central and Western Europe and the fourth biggest globally.

Perhaps even more dramatic is the commitment shown by frontline nations. Poland has become an investment powerhouse, increasing its military spending by 31% to an astonishing 4.2% of its GDP. The Polish government has consistently prioritized equipment purchases and modernization, driven by its geographic proximity to the conflict. Other nations in the Baltic and Nordic regions have similarly ramped up their budgets, focusing on capabilities vital for territorial defense, such as air defense, long-range artillery, and armored forces.

The Russian Catalyst: Industrialized Aggression

The primary driver behind Europe’s rearmament is the undeniable reality of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its subsequent decision to pivot its economy into a war footing. Moscow has demonstrated an ability to withstand extensive sanctions and maintain a high operational tempo, far exceeding initial Western intelligence estimates.

Russia’s War Economy and Production Capacity

Russia’s military expenditure has surged, increasing by over a third in a single year and representing a significant portion of its GDP. More critically, Russian defense production has been rapidly and extensively ramped up. Since the full-scale invasion, production and refurbishment of key ground capabilities have seen exponential growth. Russia produced or refurbished an estimated 1,550 tanks and 5,700 armored vehicles in 2024 alone, alongside a dramatic increase in artillery and loitering munitions production.

This dedication to production highlights Moscow’s long-term military goals, which appear undeterred by sanctions or domestic challenges such as labor shortages. SIPRI analysis concludes that Russia’s massive industrial expansion underscores that Moscow harbors no immediate intention of pursuing peace and will continue to pose a long-term military and political threat to its neighbors.

The Timeline of Potential Conflict

Security assessments across NATO and EU capitals consistently warn of a looming window of vulnerability. Assessments by Germany, Poland, Denmark, and the Baltic states estimate that Russia could be ready to initiate a conventional attack on a NATO country within three to ten years, once its forces are reconstituted and modernized after the war in Ukraine. The sheer scale of Russian forces deployed in Ukraine, estimated at hundreds of thousands of troops, provides its military with invaluable battlefield experience unmatched by any other European force.

This projected timeline is what informs the urgency of European procurement and industrial planning. The objective is not simply to match Russia in numerical terms, but to achieve a credible deterrent posture within the next half-decade, ensuring that any perceived cost of aggression against a NATO member far outweighs the potential gains. European nations are now learning the hard lesson that market economies must mobilize their industrial bases rapidly to counter a determined, totalitarian war economy.

The American Question: Shifting Geopolitical Anchor

While Russian aggression provides the tactical impetus for rearmament, the long-term strategic motivation is fueled by deep uncertainty regarding the reliability of the United States as the primary security guarantor. This concern predates the most recent surge in spending but has been sharply amplified by political rhetoric emanating from Washington, particularly from the potential for future U.S. administrations to reduce or withdraw commitments to the NATO alliance.

The Trump Factor and NATO Reliability Concerns

President Donald Trump’s repeated questioning of Article 5 commitments and his assertions that NATO allies are financially reliant on the U.S. have provoked profound worries across Europe. Surveys have shown that a significant portion of the European populace views him as an “enemy of Europe,” reflecting institutional apprehension about the reliability of the transatlantic security umbrella.

The fear is not just of an outright withdrawal but of a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic focus toward the Asia-Pacific region, or a conditionalization of defense guarantees that could encourage Russian adventurism. This possibility has led many European leaders to conclude that the continent must be able to manage its own defense needs in a high-intensity scenario, even without the immediate and guaranteed surge of U.S. troops and logistical support that has been the bedrock of Cold War planning.

Dependence on U.S. Command and Control

The reliance on the U.S. extends far beyond hardware and funding; it is deeply embedded in the command-and-control architecture of European defense. NATO structures dictate that in a major conflict, an American general, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), ultimately calls the shots. This integration, while ensuring interoperability, means that European military operations rely heavily on U.S. logistical networks, intelligence sharing, and overall strategic direction.

To reduce this systemic dependency, proposals are being explored, including the “Europeanization” of NATO leadership roles and the possibility of creating a stronger, unified European command structure. Such moves are politically complex, often running up against national sovereignty concerns and EU treaty constraints, but the objective is clear: to ensure that if the U.S. decides to scale back its commitment, Europe can maintain operational effectiveness without waiting for a green light from Washington.

Building Strategic Autonomy: EU’s Policy Response

The existential threat and the political uncertainty have galvanized the European Union to move beyond fragmented national defense planning and towards a truly joint defense industrial policy. This shift is encapsulated in several major legislative and strategic frameworks designed to build strategic autonomy—the capacity to act militarily and diplomatically when necessary, independently of external powers.

The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS)

The European Commission and the High Representative unveiled the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) in early 2024, setting a long-term vision to enhance the EU’s defense readiness by 2035. EDIS seeks to move away from relying on national defense procurement toward greater cooperation and a unified European defense market. The strategy aims to achieve several key benchmarks:

Collaborative Procurement Target: By 2030, Member States should procure at least 40% of defense equipment in a collaborative manner. This aims to standardize equipment, improve interoperability, and increase the economies of scale needed to drive down costs.
Intra-EU Trade Target: By 2030, the value of intra-EU defense trade should represent at least 35% of the total EU defense market value, fostering deeper integration of supply chains.
EU Procurement Target: Member States are asked to make steady progress towards procuring at least 50% of their defense procurement budget from within the EU by 2030, and 60% by 2035. This directly addresses the current over-reliance on U.S. suppliers, which accounted for a majority of foreign acquisitions since the start of the conflict in Ukraine.

EDIS is fundamentally about creating aggregated demand and providing industry with the predictability required to invest in increasing production capacity across the continent.

The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and Funding

To implement the EDIS vision, the EU proposed the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). EDIP is designed as the legislative and financial instrument to bridge the gap between short-term emergency measures (like EDIRPA) and the long-term strategic goals set for 2035. EDIP focuses on providing financial support, leveraging a proposed budget of €1.5 billion for the 2025–2027 period, to incentivize the defence industry to ramp up production capacity, enhance competitiveness, and cooperate across borders.

A significant component of EDIP is the introduction of a new legal framework, the Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP). SEAP is intended to simplify and scale up Member States’ cooperation on defense equipment, ensuring a streamlined process for joint armament projects. This structure works in complementarity with existing frameworks like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

Mechanisms of Cooperation: PESCO and Joint Procurement

The foundation of greater European defense integration has been slowly built over the last decade through various initiatives, most notably the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). However, the current crisis has necessitated that these mechanisms be rapidly transformed from political frameworks into efficient tools for military readiness and industrial scaling.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Evolution

PESCO was initially conceived as a means for EU member states with similar defense needs to collaborate on cooperative defense efforts and projects. It includes a political pillar of binding commitments related to defense spending and cooperation targets. Today, PESCO hosts over 66 ongoing projects ranging from the development of specific common capabilities (such as counter-battery systems informed by lessons from the war in Ukraine) to operational focus areas like coordination and training.

Despite its achievements, PESCO has often been criticized for bureaucratic complexity and a lack of ambition. In response to the new geopolitical reality, there is a push to make PESCO more strategic and effective, ensuring it genuinely embodies a commitment to common defense where initiating a project within the framework is easier and more advantageous than pursuing it outside of EU structures.

The Challenge of Intra-EU vs. External Procurement

The most immediate hurdle to achieving strategic autonomy is the entrenched habit of buying defense equipment from outside the EU, primarily from the U.S. Between 2022 and 2023, nearly 80% of defense acquisitions by EU Member States were done abroad, with American companies accounting for roughly two-thirds of that external spending. This reliance means that the massive influx of new defense spending, while beneficial to Europe’s security, has largely failed to stimulate the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) as intended.

The EDIS targets of 50% and 60% procurement from within the EU by 2030 and 2035, respectively, are designed to reverse this trend. The key to this reversal is not protectionism, but facilitating collective demand and offering a competitive, high-quality, and rapidly available supply of European-produced equipment. The long-term goal is to establish a European Military Sales Mechanism, comparable to the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, to simplify and centralize the availability of European-produced defense products for member states and key partners like Ukraine.

The drive toward a truly autonomous European defense capability is guided by several strategic objectives and commitments:

Fostering Aggregated Demand: The EU must systematically aggregate the defense requirements of its Member States to provide a clear, multi-year industrial demand signal. This stability and predictability are essential for defense companies, which typically require long-term contracts to justify massive capital investments in expanding production lines and hiring specialized personnel. Failure to pool demand leads to fractured supply and increased costs for all members.
Reducing Dependencies and Ensuring Security of Supply: The current global environment necessitates immediate action to diversify supply sources for critical components, raw materials, and technologies. The EU is establishing an Observatory of Critical Technologies to identify key material dependencies and develop roadmaps for European alternatives, ensuring that a crisis in global supply chains does not halt essential military production.
Building a True EU-Wide Market: The defense sector remains heavily fragmented by national regulations, certification hurdles, and complex transfer procedures. The EDIS seeks to simplify and harmonize these rules to create one of the largest global defense markets. This harmonization is critical for competitiveness, enabling cross-border collaboration, and allowing smaller defense technology companies and startups to scale rapidly.
Transforming Defense Through Disruptive Innovation: The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the critical importance of technologies like drone warfare, advanced cyber capabilities, and autonomous systems. European defense policy must focus investment support on advanced manufacturing processes and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into defense platforms. The EU will present a dedicated European Armament Technological Roadmap to guide this transformation.
Addressing Skills and Talent Gaps: A major ramp-up in the defense industry requires a corresponding increase in the specialized workforce. Europe faces a significant shortage of talent in STEM fields, cybersecurity, and advanced manufacturing. The strategy emphasizes large-scale initiatives to attract, train, employ, and upskill personnel to meet the surging industrial demand.
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) Implementation: The CARD process is designed to review national defense plans and identify existing capability gaps. EDIS aims to strengthen this review mechanism to ensure national investments align with the collective strategic needs of the EU and NATO, reducing duplication and promoting targeted, necessary specialization across the member states.
Facilitating Military Mobility: Rapid movement of troops and assets across the Union is vital for deterrence and rapid response. Efforts are ongoing to upgrade essential dual-use infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways, and ports) and remove administrative obstacles that hinder the swift movement of large military convoys across internal borders.
Financial Flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact: Recognizing the unique nature of defense expenditure, the European Commission has invited Member States to utilize existing flexibilities within the Stability and Growth Pact. This provides additional budgetary space to increase defense spending without immediate, rigid adherence to deficit targets, acknowledging that defense is a collective investment in European security.

Industrial Base Transformation: Ramping Up Production

For the European defense strategy to succeed, policy ambition must translate into physical industrial output. The current crisis has exposed a fundamental weakness: the inability of the existing defense industrial base to meet the massive, immediate demand for conventional ammunition, spare parts, and new platforms at scale. Transforming the industrial base is the most critical and complex undertaking.

The Defense Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB)

The European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is robust but geographically concentrated and structurally fragmented. While it consists of large multinational companies, mid-caps, and over 2,000 Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), with an estimated annual turnover of €70 billion, it has historically operated based on individual national orders rather than a large, coordinated European market. The challenge is converting this potential into guaranteed, high-volume production.

The EU is now focused on providing grants and regulatory support to mitigate the industrial investment risks that companies face. Defense firms require long-term visibility to invest in new tooling, factory expansions, and specialized workforce development. By aggregating demand through mechanisms like SEAP and providing financial guarantees via EDIP, the EU aims to create the necessary market conditions for the EDTIB to compete effectively with larger, more unified industrial powers.

Challenges of Skilled Labor, Raw Materials, and Innovation

Ramping up production faces significant systemic obstacles:

Skilled Labor Shortages: Factories cannot produce shells or missiles without specialized engineers, technicians, and skilled labor, which are currently in short supply across Europe’s manufacturing sector.
Raw Material Access: Ensuring the security of supply for critical raw materials, propellants, and components is essential, especially as global supply chains remain volatile.
Permit and Certification Procedures: Lengthy and complex national processes for granting permits and certifications for cross-border production and sales slow down the necessary speed of the defense build-up. EDIP seeks to streamline these processes with an EU-wide framework.

Furthermore, European spending on defense Research & Development (R&D) remains a fraction of the investment made by the United States, underscoring a persistent innovation gap that must be closed if the continent is to develop and field next-generation capabilities.

The Financial Framework and the Stability Pact

Financing this immense rearmament effort requires a delicate balance with the EU’s fiscal rules. The Commission has officially recognized the imperative of increased defense expenditure. By explicitly stating that the sustainable finance framework does not impede private investment in the defense industry, the EU is signaling to financial institutions that lending for defense production is not only permissible but desirable.

Moreover, the discussion about accommodating defense spending within the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is ongoing. While the SGP imposes fiscal limits, the Commission has communicated that member states can activate the national escape clause to gain budgetary space for increased defense investment, recognizing the geopolitical urgency of the security situation. The debate is now centered on whether a more permanent, structural change to the SGP is needed to treat defense spending as a collective European investment rather than a purely national debt burden.

The Debate on Future Force Requirements

The ultimate goal of rearmament is credible deterrence, which means having the right types of forces and equipment to deny Russia a quick victory in any potential conflict. This has sparked a vital debate among military planners and policy think tanks about what exactly it means to “defend Europe without the US.”

Estimates for “Defending Europe without the US”

Initial estimates from policy centers suggest that achieving military sufficiency to deter Russia without the guarantee of immediate U.S. reinforcement is immensely challenging. Some analyses project that Europe would need to mobilize up to 300,000 more troops and sustain an annual defense spending hike of at least €250 billion in the short term. These estimates take into account the necessary troop levels, equipment purchases (especially armor, artillery, and air defense), and logistical requirements needed to replace the anticipated contribution of over 200,000 American troops in a large-scale conflict scenario.

This increased spending would need to be strategically allocated, focusing not only on hardware but also on personnel recruitment, training, and the logistical spine that allows forces to move quickly and fight cohesively. A core part of the discussion involves whether a portion of this required €250 billion annual increase should be funded by the EU jointly, fostering continental capability development, while the rest is covered by increased national military expenditure, addressing moral-hazard problems where some nations might underspend.

Focus on Logistics, Training, and Technology

The nature of modern warfare, as demonstrated in Ukraine, requires far more than just increasing tank production. Key areas for European focus include:

Integrated Air and Missile Defense: The need for comprehensive, multi-layered defense shields against cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones has become paramount, leading to initiatives like the European Air Shield.
Logistics and Readiness: Europe must invest heavily in logistics, maintenance, and prepositioned supplies to ensure forces can sustain a prolonged fight. This includes stockpiling ammunition and spare parts and simplifying the cross-border movement of military assets.
Cyber and Digital Security: With nearly 28% of Europeans citing technology and digital security as a primary threat, investment in cyber defense, digital hardening of military systems, and command and control resilience is a non-negotiable priority.

Public Perception and Political Will

The success of this continental defense transformation hinges not just on industrial output and policy frameworks but on sustained political will and public support across the EU.

Survey Results on Risk Perception and Trump

Public opinion surveys across the continent reflect a deep anxiety and a new acceptance of geopolitical risk. A significant majority of Europeans rate the risk of open war with Russia in the coming years as high, a figure that is starkly higher in frontline states like Poland. Simultaneously, there is low confidence in national military capabilities, with two-thirds of respondents feeling their country is not capable of defending itself against Russian aggression.

This anxiety, coupled with the widespread view of potential disruptive U.S. policies, has created strong demand for the EU to play a protective role. The public mood supports deeper integration and military cooperation, providing the political mandate necessary for leaders to make the difficult, long-term budgetary and policy decisions required for rearmament.

The Need for Unified Resolve

European rearmament is therefore a twin challenge: military and psychological. Russia’s strategy depends heavily on exploiting European internal divisions and eroding the political will to sustain high defense costs. To succeed, European allies must anchor their actions in unified resolve and a shared understanding of the long-term threat. Increased spending is a necessary first step, but it must be coupled with the political determination to use these resources effectively and collaboratively to deter further military expansion.

The push for strategic autonomy is not about creating a separate military bloc against NATO; rather, it is about creating a stronger, more capable European pillar within NATO. The goal is a Europe capable of contributing a sufficient, credible conventional deterrent force, making the transatlantic alliance stronger and less reliant on the vagaries of American politics.

Conclusion: The Defining Moment for European Security

Europe’s rapid rearmament marks a definitive end to the post-Cold War era of low defense spending and relaxed security posture. Driven by the industrialized aggression of Russia and fundamental doubts regarding the stability of U.S. security commitments, the continent is now fully mobilized to assume greater responsibility for its own defense. This shift is institutionalized through comprehensive policy frameworks like the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and backed by unprecedented increases in national defense budgets, pushing expenditure well past historical NATO benchmarks. The ultimate success of this endeavor rests on the ability of member states to overcome historical fragmentation, translate financial commitments into actual industrial capacity, and maintain the political and public resolve required to sustain this demanding security posture for the next decade. The European defense imperative is not merely a reaction to external threats; it is a profound journey towards genuine strategic autonomy that will redefine the continent’s place in the 21st-century geopolitical order.