The military campaign waged by Israel in the Gaza Strip since the start of the conflict has been driven by a clearly articulated and dual mandate: the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and the safe return of hostages. While ground forces and precision airstrikes have undeniably degraded the group’s organized fighting power, significantly reducing its manpower and dismantling numerous battalions, the objective of eliminating the entire senior military command structure has proven exceptionally difficult. The frequent reports detailing intensified strikes that nonetheless miss key military commanders underscore a persistent strategic impasse, one rooted deeply in the unique operational environment of Gaza and the inherent resilience of the Hamas organization.

This challenge is twofold. On a strategic level, Hamas is not merely a hierarchical military force; it is a deeply embedded political, social, and military entity, meaning the strategy of “decapitation” often yields limited long-term impact on its core ideology or ability to regenerate leadership. On a tactical level, the complexity of the subterranean warfare environment—the extensive network of tunnels, bunkers, and command centers known colloquially as “the Metro”—provides an almost impenetrable shield for the military leadership actively engaged in coordinating combat operations.

The ongoing conflict has thus evolved into a prolonged shadow war. Israel’s campaign must contend not only with the visible destruction of Hamas infrastructure above ground but also with an elusive enemy operating beneath it. This detailed examination delves into the verified realities of this military puzzle, analyzing the effectiveness of targeting the organization’s political and military wings, detailing the formidable subterranean obstacles, and charting Hamas’s shift towards resilient guerrilla warfare tactics in the face of immense pressure.

The Strategic Impasse: Assessing the Decapitation Strategy

The strategy of targeting the leadership, often termed “decapitation,” aims to cripple an organization by eliminating its most skilled, experienced, and strategically vital members. Historical precedents, however, often show that while such strikes can cause temporary disruption and force resource diversion for protection and succession, they rarely lead to the complete collapse of deeply rooted non-state actors like Hamas. The recent campaign illustrates this paradox with stark clarity: while some of the most prominent figureheads have been removed, the organization’s fighting capabilities persist.

The structure of Hamas, comprising both a political/social wing and the military Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, contributes to its survival. The elimination of political figures based outside Gaza, such as the assassination of Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, removes key diplomatic and financial coordinators, but often has less immediate effect on the day-to-day fighting in the Strip. Conversely, the military commanders are often protected by layers of security, operational secrecy, and, most importantly, the underground network.

The Evolving Targets: Political vs. Military Leadership

Israeli operations have successfully targeted several high-ranking officials across both wings. The deaths of leaders like Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza and a key wartime decision-maker, and military chief Muhammad Deif, both reportedly eliminated in late 2024, represent massive blows to the command structure. Yet, the leadership vacuum is quickly filled, sometimes by lower-profile, highly capable commanders who possess intimate knowledge of the operational theater.

For instance, reports citing Israeli sources indicated that following the deaths of his brother and other top officials, **Mohammed Sinwar**, often referred to as “Shadow,” took over a commanding role in the Gaza operations. The quick succession and the ability of the organization to maintain command-and-control demonstrate a functional bureaucratic resilience. While Israel has systematically eliminated dozens of commanders and mid-level operators, the very top echelon, those who orchestrate the overall military strategy from deep concealment, continues to present an intractable challenge. The campaign’s ongoing success hinges on eliminating this core military council, which, by all indications, remains deeply entrenched and operational.

The Paradox of Targeting: Resilience and Succession

The continued existence of Hamas as a fighting force, despite the loss of its most recognizable figures, aligns with academic studies on counterinsurgency. Highly developed groups that enjoy widespread communal support and possess a strong ideological foundation have proven exceedingly difficult to displace through leadership targeting alone. Hamas is interwoven into the fabric of Palestinian society, providing social services and maintaining a political presence, which grants it an institutional depth that transcends any single leader.

The strategic failure of decapitation lies not necessarily in the lack of capability to execute the strike, but in the ensuing political and military outcomes. Targeted killings can sometimes trigger renewed outrage, fueling recruitment and generating enhanced ideological relevance for the group. This historical dynamic forces Israel to execute its strikes with near-perfect precision, aiming to minimize the civilian casualties—or “collateral damage”—that can otherwise strengthen the group’s narrative and popular support domestically and internationally.

Furthermore, Hamas uses a decentralized system in its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. While a three-man military council oversees operations, decision-making authority can quickly devolve to brigade or battalion commanders on the ground. This decentralization makes isolating and destroying the central nerve center significantly more difficult, requiring an intelligence net that can simultaneously track multiple dispersed high-value targets. The group can simply regenerate tactical losses while its strategic planning remains fluid.

Beneath the Surface: The Challenge of Gaza’s Underground Network

The most significant physical barrier to eliminating the senior military leadership is the extensive network of subterranean infrastructure, a maze of fortified tunnels, bunkers, and command centers that runs beneath the Gaza Strip. This system, dubbed “the Metro” by Israeli forces, acts as a dynamic shield, allowing commanders to move undetected, coordinate attacks, and evade targeted strikes above ground.

This underground environment is not merely a collection of simple passages; it is a complex, reinforced, and interconnected system designed for military utility and long-term habitation. The tunnels are engineered to be resilient to bombardment and equipped with communication lines, ventilation, and supplies, effectively transforming them into an underground city where top leaders can survive for extended periods, remaining far out of reach of conventional surveillance and aerial attacks.

Anatomy of the Tunnel System: The ‘Metro’ as a Command Center

Intelligence gained from previous operations, combined with engineering assessments during the current conflict, suggests hundreds of miles of tunnels exist, creating an environment tailor-made for asymmetric warfare. Hamas uses these tunnels both defensively and offensively. Defensively, they serve as protected retreats for high-value targets and command posts, shielding leaders from missile and drone strikes. Offensively, they enable surprise attacks, allowing fighters to emerge behind Israeli lines, conduct ambushes, and then vanish back into the ground before forces can effectively retaliate.

The challenge for Israeli forces is not just locating the tunnels, but distinguishing between operational tunnels used by military leaders and the countless shafts, storage caches, or civilian bomb shelters that may be interconnected. The sandy soil of Gaza necessitates reinforcement, and the discovery of prefabricated concrete support panels provides one clue for troops on the ground, but locating the central hubs of the military command structure within this vast, hidden complex is akin to finding specific corridors in a darkened labyrinth.

Technological Countermeasures and Limitations

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have employed a combination of advanced technologies and traditional human intelligence to map and neutralize the tunnels, but each method faces inherent limitations due to the terrain and the enemy’s tactics. The effort requires a multi-sensor approach, leveraging technology and human sources to overcome the natural camouflage of the underground:

Seismic and Acoustic Sensor Arrays: These systems are deployed to detect subtle vibrations associated with excavation, personnel movement, and material transport within the tunnels. However, the sandy composition of the Gaza soil often dampens these vibrations, making it difficult to differentiate between natural subterranean movements and active human activity. Success requires highly specialized software analysis to filter noise and isolate specific operational signatures.
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR): GPR is used to image subsurface structures non-destructively, attempting to locate voids and construction materials that betray the presence of a tunnel. The challenge is immense; data interpretation requires expert training to accurately distinguish between legitimate tunnel structures and natural geological formations, leading to a high rate of false positives and a laborious verification process.
Thermal Imaging Systems: Utilizing both airborne and ground-based thermal sensors, the IDF attempts to identify thermal gradients. These temperature differences can indicate active tunnel ventilation systems expelling hot air or newly constructed sections where the earth has been recently disturbed. Their effectiveness is highly dependent on ambient weather conditions and the sophistication of the tunnels’ insulation and concealment techniques.
Visual Reconnaissance and Satellite Imagery: This involves intense scrutiny of high-resolution satellite and aerial photographs to spot minute changes in the landscape, such as disturbed earth, disguised ventilation shafts, or anomalies in the built environment. On the ground, soldiers physically search for hidden entrances and inconsistencies, a highly dangerous task due to the ever-present threat of booby traps and enemy ambush.
Advanced Explosive and Flooding Techniques: Specialized munitions are employed to penetrate deep underground, while methods involving flooding shafts with water are used to disable large sections of the network. However, these methods are often resource-intensive, carry risks of collateral damage, and do not guarantee the elimination of leaders who may have already moved to alternate locations within the network.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Exploitation: Arguably the most critical factor, HUMINT involves the interrogation of captured fighters and the cultivation of reliable sources within Gaza. This information can pinpoint the location of specific tunnel entrances, command nodes, and, most crucially, the routes and gathering locations used by senior commanders. The scarcity and sensitivity of such intelligence make it exceptionally valuable but also highly perishable.

The Shift in Hamas’s Operational Doctrine

Facing overwhelming conventional military pressure, Hamas has demonstrated significant tactical flexibility, transitioning its forces from organized battalion-level engagements to dispersed, low-signature guerrilla warfare. This adaptation is a natural response to the degradation of their centralized fighting capability and directly contributes to the evasion of top military figures.

The ability of Hamas to regroup and resume combat in areas the IDF previously declared as cleared or controlled underscores the difficulty of achieving a permanent military eradication. When forces are withdrawn or reduced, Hamas elements quickly re-establish a presence, often through the use of localized cells and the enduring utility of the tunnel system.

Transition to Guerrilla Warfare

As the conflict has dragged on, the nature of engagement has increasingly become asymmetric. Hamas fighters rely less on massed attacks and more on highly targeted, lethal actions using explosives and ambushes. This tactical shift is characterized by:

Reliance on Explosives: The predominant form of combat since the most intense phase of the war has been the detonation of landmines, command-detonated explosives, and IEDs planted in buildings or tunnel shafts as Israeli forces approach. This technique maximizes lethality while minimizing the direct exposure of Hamas fighters.
Ambush Tactics: Utilizing the underground network for cover and concealment, small cells of Hamas fighters conduct ambushes, emerging suddenly from subterranean exits, launching anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at heavily armored Israeli vehicles, and rapidly retreating. Weapons like the Russian-designed RPG-29, capable of defeating modern tank armor, remain highly effective in confined urban terrain.
Drone Usage: While not the primary focus, the employment of a spectrum of drones, from military-grade suicide drones to commercial off-the-shelf quadcopters modified to drop munitions, adds a layer of complexity. These systems are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and localized strikes, reflecting a modernizing approach to urban combat that complicates Israeli intelligence and air superiority.

This decentralized, low-signature approach means that top military commanders are not directing large, visible formations that can be targeted by satellite or aerial surveillance. Instead, they are coordinating smaller, dispersed cells, relying on encrypted communications and the protection of the tunnels, making their location fluid and their identification exceptionally challenging.

Regrouping and Resilience in Northern Gaza

The experience in the northern governorates, including Gaza City and North Gaza, has highlighted the problem of organizational persistence. Even after the IDF announced the dismantling of Hamas brigades and the establishment of control, evidence suggests that the organization retained sufficient operational capability to regroup. This forces the IDF to conduct continuous, smaller-scale ground raids to prevent Hamas from fully re-establishing its authority and military presence. This pattern of re-engagement demonstrates that destroying infrastructure and killing mid-level fighters does not automatically translate into the defeat of the strategic command structure, which remains able to influence events and sustain the armed struggle.

The military intelligence challenge is to transition from simply neutralizing known operatives to identifying and predicting the movements of the key orchestrators who are now prioritizing survival and long-term command continuity over direct combat involvement. Their success in evasion is directly tied to the ability of the broader organization to continue operating.

The Role of External and Internal Intelligence

The failure to locate and eliminate key military leaders often comes down to an intelligence gap—specifically, the difficulty in obtaining timely, actionable Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in an environment designed for secrecy and deeply hostile to foreign intervention. The leaders of the military wing are masters of counter-intelligence and concealment, applying lessons learned over decades of conflict.

Human Intelligence in a Dense Urban Environment

Gaza is one of the most densely populated territories on Earth, making it a difficult environment for intelligence gathering. The widespread displacement of the population, with roughly 90% having been internally displaced, further complicates the task of monitoring and identifying specific individuals. Commanders rarely stay in one location for long, rely on secure, encrypted communications systems, and avoid associating with large groups that could attract surveillance.

The most critical intelligence comes from within Hamas ranks—captured fighters, local sources, or signals intercepts. However, the organization’s tight internal security and pervasive fear of collaboration limit the flow of reliable, current information. Furthermore, the information that is gathered often has a short shelf life. By the time ground forces are mobilized or an airstrike is prepared based on HUMINT, the target may have already moved through the subterranean network.

The Protection of Political Sanctuaries

While the focus of the current difficulty is on military commanders in Gaza, the role of external sanctuaries cannot be overstated. For many years, leaders of Hamas’s political wing operated from relative safety in countries like Qatar and Turkey. The principle that political leadership could orchestrate violence from safe havens while remaining immune to the consequences was a major long-term strategic frustration for Israel.

The strikes against Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the successful elimination of Yahya Sinwar in Gaza fractured this separation of power, demonstrating Israel’s commitment to holding all levels of leadership accountable, regardless of location. Yet, the remaining political bureau members, still largely based abroad, continue to handle critical financial, diplomatic, and logistical support functions, ensuring the organizational infrastructure remains viable and capable of raising funds and seeking political backing, which ultimately sustains the military wing.

The organization’s ability to draw support from Iran and its “axis of resistance” network, which includes Hezbollah in Lebanon and militias in Iraq and Syria, provides a financial and arms pipeline that helps replace battlefield losses. Disrupting this transnational support network is a key component of preventing the military wing from fully reconstituting itself, a task that goes far beyond the scope of military operations within the Gaza Strip itself.

The Broader Political and Military Landscape

The difficulty in eliminating key military commanders is not simply a technical failure; it reflects the deep complexity of defeating a political-military movement that also functions as the de facto governing authority of a territory.

Impact on Governance and Civilian Chaos

When Israel successfully targets Hamas officials—particularly those involved in internal security and civil administration, such as Mahmoud Abu Watfa, the director of Hamas’s Interior Ministry—it creates an immediate impact on Hamas’s ability to govern. The elimination of these figures can weaken Hamas’s hold on the populace, which is necessary for long-term military success. These internal governance officials coordinate municipal affairs, police forces, and the distribution of aid, preventing challenges to Hamas’s rule.

However, the immediate consequence of such administrative decapitation, in the absence of a viable alternative governing authority, is often heightened chaos and a humanitarian catastrophe. The lack of an organized body to manage aid distribution exacerbates acute shortages of food, water, and medical care, creating instability that ironically can be exploited by Hamas to reassert control through localized charity or through the vacuum created by lawlessness.

Escalation in the West Bank

A crucial outcome of the focused military pressure in Gaza has been a significant intensification of Hamas-linked militant activity in the West Bank. The organization, historically active but subdued in the West Bank, has leveraged the Gaza conflict to escalate its operations there. Data confirms a near doubling of violent incidents linked to Hamas in the region compared to previous periods.

These actions serve a clear strategic purpose: they divert Israeli security resources away from Gaza, open a second active front of resistance, and undermine the already strained authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA). By executing high-impact, complex explosive operations in the West Bank, Hamas demonstrates its capacity to maintain an armed struggle across separate territories, reinforcing its ideological relevance among Palestinians regardless of the military losses suffered in Gaza.

The persistent activity and regrouping capabilities, coupled with the reliance on asymmetric tactics and the utilization of the subterranean shield, confirm that Israel’s campaign has become one of attrition, rather than a quick, decisive victory aimed at total elimination. The key military commanders who remain at large are the lynchpin of this continued resistance, driving the tactical fight from the shadows and forcing Israel into a prolonged, complex, and resource-intensive urban warfare scenario.

The military intelligence community will continue to prioritize the elimination of these high-value military targets, recognizing that while the ideology of Hamas cannot be destroyed by a missile strike, the capacity for coordinated, lethal military operations is critically dependent on the survival of this small, elusive core of senior military leadership.

Conclusion

The campaign to neutralize Hamas leadership faces persistent and profound challenges that stem from the intersection of a complex subterranean battlespace and the intrinsic nature of the organization itself. Despite substantial tactical successes, including the elimination of pivotal figures such as Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Muhammad Deif, the objective of dismantling the core military command structure entirely remains incomplete. The strategic difficulty lies in the resilience of Hamas’s political and bureaucratic depth, which ensures rapid leadership succession, while the tactical obstacle is the vast, fortified network of tunnels that provides indispensable sanctuary for military commanders like Mohammed Sinwar and Marwan Issa.

Hamas has effectively adapted by transitioning to decentralized guerrilla warfare, utilizing explosives and ambushes from concealed positions, forcing Israeli forces into protracted urban clearing operations. This necessitates continuous, resource-heavy raids to counter the enemy’s ability to regroup in areas already cleared. The continuation of the shadow war is directly tied to the survival of these key, elusive military leaders, whose operational influence is sustained by the organization’s financial support from external allies and its deep roots in the civilian population. Ultimately, achieving a lasting change in the security landscape requires not just the elimination of specific individuals, but a comprehensive strategy to counter the subterranean threat and create a viable alternative to Hamas’s governance and ideology, a political objective that currently remains the greater, unresolved challenge.